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Abstract: 
In this paper we address two interrelated research gaps in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) literature. The first results from a lack of understanding of different patterns of CSR 
engagement with respect to CSR talk (impression management and the creation of symbolic 
images and documentation) and CSR walk (substantive implementation of CSR policies, 
structures and procedures). Related to this, the second gap concerns limited knowledge about 
the influence of firm size on CSR engagement. We develop a conceptual model that explains 
differences in CSR talk versus walk based on organizational cost and firm size. This allows us 
to theorize the antecedents of what we call the large firm implementation gap (large firms 
tend to focus on communicating CSR symbolically but do less to implement it into their core 
structures and procedures) and vice versa the small firm communication gap (less active 
communication and more emphasis on implementation). Our model expands a new theoretical 
understanding of CSR engagement based on as yet underemphasized firm-level antecedents 
of CSR, and opens up several new avenues for future, and in particular comparative, research. 
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Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) continues to advance despite a range of inadequately 
understood and sometimes contradictory phenomena. CSR can be defined ‘as actions that 
appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required 
by law’ (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p. 117). Increases in the presumed sophistication of 
responsible business initiatives occur concurrently with wave upon wave of corporate 
scandals and accusations of harmful behaviour. Meanwhile concerns proliferate that CSR 
initiatives have had only marginal positive impact on social and environmental conditions 
(Locke, 2013; Whiteman et al., 2013). We contribute to the explanation of these incongruities 
and explore the influence of firm size, organizational structure and related cost implications 
on CSR. 
A central issue in the CSR debate is the distinction between, colloquially speaking, 
‘talking’ and ‘walking’ social, ethical and environmental responsibility in a business context 
(e.g., Berliner and Prakash, 2015; Haack et al., 2012). We understand these elements 
collectively as a firm’s CSR engagement (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), which we define as 
an overarching concept of how firms combine the two key dimensions of CSR – (1) the 
primarily externally facing documentation of corporate responsibilities (‘talk’) and (2) the 
implementation of strategies, structures and procedures in core business processes within and 
across divisions, functions, value chains, etc., that facilitate corporate responsibility (‘walk’). 
We will show that the two components of CSR engagement have a tendency to be 
incongruent and influenced by firm size. CSR talk encompasses ‘the various outbound 
communication channels deployed by organizations to communicate with customers and 
other constituencies’ (Balmer and Greyser, 2006, p. 735), such as CSR reports, corporate 
websites, advertising and product labelling (Du et al., 2010). By contrast CSR walk 
encompasses substantive ‘actions within the firm, such as changing methods of production to 
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reduce environmental impacts or changing labour relationships both within the firm and 
across the firm’s value chain’ (Aguilera et al., 2007, p. 836).  
Previous research has acknowledged the inconsistency of individual firm CSR 
engagements. Companies are frequently criticized for not walking the talk (e.g., Lyon and 
Montgomery, 2015; McDonnell and King, 2013). Roberts for instance (2003, p. 250) is 
concerned that ‘all this talk of ethics is just that – talk; new forms of corporate self-
presentation that have no reference to (...) what is practised in the name of the corporation, 
beyond (...) good public relations. In this form, corporate social responsibility is cheap and 
easy’. Scholars have investigated the presumed (mis)match between CSR talk and walk, 
under labels such as ‘greenwashing’ (e.g., Bowen, 2014; Delmas and Burbano, 2011) or 
‘decoupling’ (e.g., Haack et al., 2012; Marquis and Qian, 2014). 
However, extant research widely neglects the influence of firm size on patterns of 
CSR engagement (see critically e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007; Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007; Scherer at al., 2016). Taking a comparative perspective on CSR is important 
both from a practical and theoretical point of view, because the large firm perspective – 
accounting for the vast majority of research and public attention – is usually assumed to apply 
to all organizational types (see critically e.g., Mitchell et al., 1997; Tang et al., 2012). 
Refuting the appropriateness of this, however, is a growing body of research on smaller firms 
that on average constitute 95% of businesses worldwide (Muller et al., 2014). This research 
shows that many small firms have substantive and effective approaches to CSR, while these 
are distinct from large firms (Gray et al., 1995; Spence, 2016). Small firms engage in CSR 
based on implicit behavioural guiding principles rather than formal structures and codes of 
conduct common in large firms (Jenkins, 2004; Wickert, 2014).  
Here, we start from the position that extant literature has been hampered by a lack of 
clarity on the nature of CSR engagement. Research often assumes that larger firms are better 
positioned to engage in CSR, while there is a lack of clear differentiation between walk and 
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talk (e.g., Husted and Salazar, 2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Yet, studies that 
scrutinize the integration of CSR in corporate practices show that while many large firms 
extensively talk CSR (e.g. Castelló and Lozano, 2011; Du et al., 2010), implementation lags 
behind (i.e., there is an implementation gap) (e.g., Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; Delmas and 
Burbano, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2015).  
Smaller firms, on the other hand, are challenged by a lack of resources such as human 
or financial capital, they lack economies of scale, and face less public pressure to engage in 
CSR (Jenkins, 2004). However, the assumption that small firms as a result ‘do less’ in terms 
of CSR has been questioned in the literature (Spence, 2016). Some studies provide evidence 
of small firms capable of effective CSR engagement (e.g., Brammer et al., 2012; Hammann et 
al., 2009; Hoogendoorn et al., 2015; Wickert, 2014). Many small firms engage in CSR by 
‘silently’ implementing a wide range of practices and procedures to uphold social and 
environmental responsibility in their business operations (Jorgensen and Knudsen, 2006; 
Russo and Perrini, 2010). However, they typically don’t produce reports or develop websites 
for social responsibility statements for external audiences (Nielsen and Thomsen, 2009) so 
visibility of their CSR practices tends to be low. As a result, smaller firms seem to be 
walking, but not talking CSR (i.e., there is a communication gap) (Baumann-Pauly et al., 
2013). It thus remains an open theoretical question why these heterogeneous patterns of CSR 
engagement between firms of different sizes can be observed. Empirical evidence of this 
phenomenon has yet to offer theoretical explanations, which we seek to provide in this paper. 
For analytical distinction, we regard ‘smaller’ versus ‘larger’ firms along a continuum 
‘where size is defined as the number of individuals participating in the activity of the firm’ 
(Camancho, 1991, p. 137). As Child (1973, p. 170) has argued, ‘since it is people who are 
organized’, this measure is generally assumed as the strongest determinant of organizational 
structure (Kimberly, 1976). To facilitate our theorizing, we base our assumption on what can 
be considered a ‘typical’ – low visibility, privately owned and locally-orientated – small firm 
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with fewer than 250 employees compared to a ‘typical’ – highly visible, publicly owned and 
globally-orientated – large multinational firm (commonly referred to as a multinational 
corporation, i.e. MNC) with several (ten)-thousand employees. This is useful because such 
size differentials imply the most apparent distinctions in structural organizational 
characteristics and allow for the development of a prudent theoretical model (Child, 1973). In 
the discussion section, we will reflect on the trade-offs of such simplifications and develop a 
context-sensitive research agenda. In our model we focus on size effects. Yet, we are aware 
that other attributes such as ownership, visibility, and market scope possibly have related 
implications when looking at the walk-talk mismatch among small and large firms. While we 
pick these attributes up in the proposed research agenda, their implications have yet to be 
fully explored and the current paper seeks to make an important step in this direction. 
Our main aim in the current paper is thus to explore the cost implications of firm size, 
and to develop a theoretical model of CSR engagement. We predict that as firm size increases 
– all else being equal – a particular pattern of CSR engagement (CSR walk versus CSR talk) 
will become more or less favourable in financial terms and thus provides an economic 
incentive for firms to invest in CSR walk or talk, respectively. In a nutshell, we propose that 
the portions of the costs of talking or walking CSR (defined as the proportion of total time, 
labour, assets and resources associated with CSR communication or implementation in 
relation to the total costs of the firm; see Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013), can explain the 
differences in the patterns of CSR engagement between smaller and larger firms. These shares 
of CSR-related communication or implementation costs are dependent on size, because large 
firms have characteristics that make talking CSR relatively less costly (compared with small 
firms) if it is centrally organized. For large firms creating a centrally located CSR department 
that files and distributes CSR reports is only a small part of total firm costs whereas for small 
firms this is a huge expense compared with other core business costs. In contrast large firms 
have characteristics that make walking CSR relatively more costly (compared with small 
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firms) as it involves the coordination and control of largely decentralized activities across 
divisions, functions, and value chains, and vice versa. For large multinational firms 
implementing CSR standards across subsidiaries in different countries with a diversified 
workforce is a tremendous task, whereas for small firms that have frequent face-to-face 
interaction among very few employees and often have strong identities based on the values of 
the owner-manager the implementation of ethical principles is likely to be less complex. 
We make two contributions. First, by connecting the literatures on organizational costs 
and CSR, our model provides a theoretical explanation for the mismatch between CSR walk 
and talk in small and large firms. Rather than looking at the assumed benefits of CSR, such as 
enhanced competitiveness or share price, or external determinants such as institutional 
pressures as independent variables, the internally derived costs for walking versus talking 
CSR present an important but as yet neglected complement to studies that examine CSR 
engagement. While the theory of the firm perspective on CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) 
and contingency theory (Blau, 1970; Child, 1973) are the main bases for our theoretical 
model, we also draw on arguments stemming from organizational economics (transaction cost 
theory, resource based view, and agency theory). We show that our argument on small and 
large firm CSR is consistent within these perspectives, and point out how our theory of the 
firm-based model can be utilized by CSR scholars drawing on other theoretical foundations 
such as institutional theory. Second, we develop a theoretical basis for size-aware and 
comparative size research in CSR. This is an important direction for future research that seeks 
to better understand why small and large firms engage in CSR differently, while also 
acknowledging the contribution of small firms in tackling questions of social and 
environmental responsibility.  
The paper proceeds as follows: We scrutinize three important limitations of existing 
CSR theories to explain size-related differences in CSR engagement, and then review the 
literature on firm size and organizational costs. We present a theoretical model to explain the 
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inconsistencies between CSR walk and talk among small and large firms. We end with a 
discussion of implications for CSR theory, sketch a size-aware and context-sensitive agenda 
for future research, and acknowledge some boundary conditions of our model. 
Corporate Social Responsibility Engagement 
Existing studies that seek to explain why firms engage in CSR tend to be based on three 
broad, but not mutually exclusive motives (Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal and Roth, 2000). 
First, the economic perspective argues that CSR is driven by instrumental motives, and that 
firms engage in CSR because they attempt to obtain financial benefits or enhance their 
competitiveness (e.g., Husted and Salazar, 2006; McWilliams et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2012). 
Second, the relational, or institutional perspective argues that CSR is driven by external 
demands. Firms respond to stakeholder expectations (Mitchell et al., 1997), and engage in 
activities that are considered socially acceptable and legitimate (Campbell, 2007; Chiu and 
Sharfman, 2011). For instance, they follow trends that take place on the field level, such as 
increasing standardization of CSR (Haack et al., 2012). Related to this CSR behaviour has 
been explained by different socio-economic influences (Marano and Kostova, 2015; Matten 
and Moon, 2008; Schneider et al., 2016). Third, the ethical perspective argues that CSR 
behaviour can be explained by moral considerations (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994), for 
instance of managers (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004).  
With regard to firm size related differences in patterns of CSR engagement and the 
intensified critique of an apparent mismatch between CSR walk and talk, these explanations 
have three important limitations. First, much extant research tends to focus on explaining why 
firms do or do not engage in CSR in the first place (e.g., Bansal and Roth, 2000; Campbell, 
2007). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) as well as Husted and Salazar (2006) for instance 
provide powerful analyses of CSR engagement based on cost-benefit considerations and 
suggest various factors that predict different levels of overall CSR engagement. However, as 
Bowen (2014, p. 83) has criticized, ‘they effectively assumed that all investment [in CSR] is 
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substantive.’ Likewise, many other studies do not sufficiently distinguish between CSR talk 
and walk when making claims about CSR engagement (e.g., Aragón-Correa, 1998; Russo and 
Fouts, 1997). 
Second, existing literature remains incomplete in linking these differences to the 
influence of firm size, as most studies investigate CSR in small (e.g., Brammer et al., 2012; 
Hoogendoorn et al., 2015) or large (e.g., Bondy et al., 2012; Pinkse et al., 2010) firms 
separately. A notable exception is the study by Darnall and colleagues (2010), who model the 
extent of proactive environmental practices in small versus large firms based on external 
stakeholder pressure. Their model suggests that small firms are more responsive to 
stakeholder demands. Nevertheless the authors underemphasize the possible mismatch 
between attributes of CSR talk and walk, as environmental practices are referred to as a 
combination of symbolic and substantive actions.  
Many other studies that examine firm size consider it as a control variable without 
giving adequate attention to important structural organizational characteristics, and how size 
relates to CSR outcomes in relative, rather than absolute terms. Aragón-Correa (1998) for 
instance models the relationship between firm size and proactive environmental strategies, but 
only includes a sample of relatively large firms (above 1000 employees). Other studies 
control for size but limit their sample to publicly listed firms (e.g., Adams and Hardwick, 
1998; Brammer and Millington, 2006), to firms included in various sustainability rankings 
(e.g., Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Russo and Fouts, 1997), or indexes such as the Fortune 
Global 500 (Muller and Kräussl, 2011). This creates a large-firm bias, which omits exactly 
those firms that represent the most common form of business, namely small owner-managed 
firms with only a few hundred employees at most.  
The large-firm bias is also reflected in many studies that analyse financial donations to 
link philanthropy to firm size (e.g., Brammer et al., 2009), and which generally argue that 
increasing firm size promotes philanthropic engagement. Many small firms, however, do not 
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donate money, but other resources such as time, space and expertise, which are difficult to 
measure, but remain philanthropic contributions. Due to these omissions, the extant literature 
falls short of explaining differing CSR engagement of small and large firms.  
Third, the literature’s tendency to base explanations for CSR engagement on the 
presumed strategic benefits of CSR, in particular increased financial performance, neglects 
the significance of the costs of CSR engagement. Resonating with a theory of the firm 
perspective, the cost dimension of CSR generally depicts that ‘corporations invest in [CSR] 
(...) as long as the benefits exceed or at least equal the costs’ (Scherer et al., 2013, p. 265; see 
also McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), while there are ‘costs associated with CSR, because 
resources must be allocated to allow the firm to achieve CSR status’ (Siegel and Vitaliano, 
2007, p. 774). Taking different cost implications of CSR walk and talk into account becomes 
important, because many business firms invest in communicating their CSR activities to 
create a positive image and give the impression of meeting societal expectations. Costs related 
to CSR talk generally include those associated with advertising, marketing, communication, 
reporting and disclosure of a firm’s CSR activities (Bowen, 2014). At the same time, 
however, firms may try to avoid the costs of actual CSR implementation (Berliner and 
Prakash, 2015).  
While it has been widely argued that engaging in CSR has become a ‘must have’ for 
businesses (Bondy et al., 2012; Matten and Moon, 2008), many scholars share the concern 
that evidence for a business case of CSR continues to be inconclusive at best (Crane et al., 
2014; Delmas et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2012). This leaves the cost-benefit-ratio of CSR rather 
intangible, while there are tangible costs involved in the implementation of CSR in 
organizational processes. Companies are for instance expected to rearrange their value chains 
(e.g. stop sourcing from factories with low working standards or child labour), change their 
product technologies or production processes (e.g. avoid toxic substances, employ green 
technologies), or spend resources on public policy issues (e.g. invest in public education, 
JMS S0299 – final version 11 
public health, or infrastructure). Importantly, these have potentially far reaching cost 
implications that are difficult to calculate ex ante while the benefits from such CSR 
investments are uncertain and difficult to attribute to CSR ex post (Scherer et al., 2013). Even 
if firms do not engage in CSR they may suffer loss of reputation (Berliner and Prakash, 
2015). 
However, the benefits-based view neglects how size-specific organizational structures 
influence the cost-benefit-ratio of CSR. In particular, it is important to consider how the cost 
implications of size influence the patterns of CSR engagement, i.e. the decision about the 
mixture of centralized (CSR talk) versus decentralized CSR activities (CSR walk) in small 
and large firms. Bowen summarized extant research arguing that more attention is needed 
because ‘the relative costs [of CSR talk and CSR walk] may be an important driver of this 
decision that has not yet been examined sufficiently’ (2014, p. 231).  
In light of the limitations of the extant literature to explain differences in CSR 
engagement among small and large firms, our core argument is thus that conceptualizing the 
relative costs of CSR engagement is a means of explaining firm behaviour which yields high 
explanatory power. We not only acknowledge variations in firm size, but equally consider 
important disparities between talking and walking CSR. Our research question asks: Why do 
firms of different sizes exhibit different patterns of CSR engagement in the form of 
considerable discrepancies between CSR talk and walk? In order to develop the conceptual 
model, next we connect the literature on firm size and organizational costs to research on CSR 
engagement. 
Firm Size and Organizational Costs 
The relationship between firm size, organizational structure and implications on 
organizational costs is well established in contingency theory and organizational economics 
(amongst others, see Blau, 1970; Child, 1973; Downs, 1966; Hsu et al., 1983; Kimberly, 
1976; Klatzsky, 1970; Pondy, 1969; Williamson, 1967). This debate has, however, received 
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little attention in the CSR literature. There is strong consensus that firm size as one of many 
variables that define organizational structure, including technology, the institutional 
environment or ownership, is perhaps the most pervasive in terms of the number of suggested 
relationships with other organizational features (e.g., Child, 1973; Child and Mansfield, 1972; 
Hsu et al., 1983). Accordingly, other central structural attributes that characterize 
organizations are strongly influenced by firm size. It is because of this general consensus in 
the literature about the predictive capacity of firm size (e.g., Child, 1973; for a recent review 
see Josefy et al., 2015) that we single out this variable. This allows a deeper theoretical 
exploration of underlying processes based upon which we develop our conceptual model. We 
acknowledge a trade-off between theoretical abstraction and context-sensitivity, and that other 
context-variables are also relevant. We develop these factors in our discussion where we 
propose a size-aware research agenda that builds upon and expands the cost dimension. 
The literature on organizational structure and bureaucratic theory suggests two 
fundamental administrative tasks – control (e.g., Kimberly, 1976; Williamson, 1967) and 
coordination (e.g., Blau, 1970; Klatzsky, 1970) – that have substantial and significantly 
distinct cost implications in the context of CSR engagement as firm size increases. While 
uniform definitions do not exist in the literature (see Ouchi, 1979), in the context of this study 
control refers to the managerial command, direction or regulation of the behaviour of other 
actors inside an organization, such as subordinates. Coordination, in turn, refers to managerial 
attempts to ensure the efficient and effective operation of the organization’s functions in line 
with its objectives. While some of the extant literature suggests economies of scale in the 
administrative handling of coordination and control problems – and which explain the 
nonlinear relationship between firm size and the magnitude of the administrative component – 
larger organizations require more complex administrative tasks in the form of sophisticated 
control and coordination systems (Josefy et al., 2015; Kimberly, 1976). This increases the 
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costs of administration, because larger, highly differentiated organizations have a relatively 
larger administrative component than smaller firms (Kimberly, 1976).  
As we will show, the need for control and coordination has implications for different 
administrative tasks necessary for engaging in CSR, which causes different organizational 
costs for those CSR-related tasks that are predominantly centrally organized – talking CSR – 
versus those tasks that are predominantly decentrally organized – walking CSR. It should be 
noted that we do not suggest that large (small) firms have a general cost (dis)advantage, but 
that there are different cost implications when comparing the relative costs associated with 
CSR talk and walk.  
In the following, we link the two key parameters of our conceptual model. Namely, we 
describe how the different administrative tasks, control and coordination, have different 
organizational cost implications for CSR engagement depending on firm size. Building on 
extant literature, we will argue that large firms have cost advantages over small firms when it 
comes to organizing CSR talk – relative to CSR walk – because this can be centrally 
organized (e.g. a CSR department files a CSR report) and economies of scale and scope can 
be more easily realized. Studies have described this advantage as the ‘liability of smallness’ 
(e.g. Josefy et al., 2015, p. 740). Small firms, in contrast, have cost advantages when it comes 
to organizing CSR walk – relative to CSR talk. CSR walk is a largely decentralized activity 
where various functions (e.g. procurement, production, sales) are involved and where small 
firms benefit from less bureaucracy, complexity and inertia, easing the diffusion of CSR 
practices throughout the firm. This has been referred to as the ‘liability of largeness’ (Josefy 
et al., 2015, p. 746) or ‘liability of size’ (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Based on these premises, 
we examine the different cost implications of firm size for CSR walk and talk. Our model 
depicts the costs of talking versus walking CSR in relative terms and as a proportion of the 
total firm costs, compared to each other and comparing small and large firms. 
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CSR Walk, Organizational Costs, and Firm Size 
According to the ‘Law of Diminishing Control’, the larger an organization becomes, the 
weaker the control over its actions (Downs, 1966, p. 109). Thus, to influence the actions of 
those who are distant from the headquarters becomes increasingly difficult. Administrative 
tasks that are centrally organized, in other words managed by or close to the headquarters of a 
large organization such as the development of CSR policies by the CSR department, need to 
trickle down the organization to decentralized divisions and functional departments (e.g. 
procurement, production, sales) where the value creation processes take place (Blau, 1970).  
Pfeffer (1978, p. 37) argued that in large and usually highly diversified businesses, due 
to their magnitude of functionally different and specialized jobs, ‘few participants are 
constantly involved or care about every dimension of the organization’s operations’. 
Furthermore, the naturally limited oversight capacity of managers at the top of organizations 
implies that increasing size will inevitably lead to a loss of control over departments or sub-
divisions (Williamson, 1967). In what has been described as the ‘rumour-transmission-
process’ (Bartlett, 1932), information that is transmitted across successive hierarchical levels 
becomes distorted the more often it is reproduced. This creates information asymmetry within 
larger firms and towards internal stakeholders such as employees and among management, 
which we expect to be more prevalent in larger than in smaller firms (see Siegel and 
Vitaliano, 2007). This is driven by ‘limits to intelligence as the size of a group increases and 
problems of information communication, coordination, interpretation and integration 
multiply’ (Glynn, 1996, pp. 1104–1105). 
Asymmetric information reduces information quality and consistency, which needs to 
be compensated by costly control devices such as supervision, redundancy, reorganization, or 
overlapping areas of responsibility. For large firm CSR departments, it is thus relatively 
costly to apply control devices that help to ensure that CSR-related policies and guidelines are 
understood and implemented in organizational practices by functional departments. For 
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example, large firms are pressured by civil society actors to extend their CSR activities not 
only to subsidiaries in different countries but also to their supply chains, including first-tier 
and extending to second- and third-tier suppliers (Scherer et al., 2013). Controlling the 
implementation of CSR standards to which the firm has publicly committed, however, is very 
costly given that large firms usually have numerous subsidiaries, several thousand suppliers 
across the globe, often switching suppliers depending on price.  
In contrast, for owner-managed smaller firms, Pondy (1969) suggests that it is more 
likely that owner-managers are unwilling to dilute their personal discretionary power and 
control over the organization, refraining from adding layers of hierarchy or administration. 
This makes control over the different tasks handled by a small firm relatively less costly. 
Research suggests that where small firm owner-managers are committed to CSR, they would 
most likely take personal responsibility for implementation (Wickert, 2014), avoiding 
impression management. In addition, smaller firms face lower internal information 
asymmetry because they have less difficulty controlling conformity to expected socially 
responsible behaviour among their employees with which the owner-manager often has 
personal and long-term relationships based on mutual reliance and trust (Spence et al., 2003). 
We conclude that the costs for control in relation to CSR walk increase with firm size. We 
now turn to the question of how coordination costs in relation to CSR walk develop with 
increasing firm size. 
 Since large organizational size implies increasing administrative complexity, it 
follows that the costs of internally coordinating the different activities of a firm in order to 
ensure efficient operations also grow, in particular if different responsibilities and priorities 
within the firm need to be aligned. This applies to the internal implementation of CSR (walk), 
as well as ensuring consistency between implementation and external communication 
(walking the talk). For instance, while in large firms the development and execution of a CSR 
strategy is usually overseen by the CSR department, other functional departments are 
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increasingly involved, such as legal, PR, or marketing (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). These 
departments may have different interests when it comes to setting CSR priorities. A PR 
department might be more inclined to engage in effective but low-cost CSR activities that 
reflect CSR talk, such as ceremonially adopting an environmental standard (Haack et al., 
2012). At the same time, productive units such as manufacturing might be inclined to avoid 
the costs of implementing costly environmental practices where payoffs are intangible (such 
as reputation gains). Costly control and coordination mechanisms are thus necessary to align 
these interests if a firm wants to roll out a consistent CSR programme. 
Blau (1970) has in this regard suggested a U-shaped cost-curve of coordination, while 
others have argued for a curvilinear expansion – the percentage of coordination costs increase 
with size up to a given point, and then stabilize (Klatzsky, 1970). The latter resonates with 
arguments by Kimberly (1976) who suggests that as firms grow marginal size effects on 
organizational structure are high for very small organizations, while these effects are 
diminishing as organizations become larger. Nevertheless, complexity and organizational 
differentiation also lead to increases in coordination costs, which particularly apply to 
contemporary multinational large firms that operate across countries and cultures.  
Becker and Murphy (1992) elaborate further on the role of coordination cost and argue 
that the costs of coordinating specialized workers, as well as the amount of knowledge that is 
necessary for the production process to work efficiently, are critically influenced by the 
degree of specialization of an organization. Specialization is said to increase until the 
marginal productivity gains from a greater division of labour are balanced by the additional 
marginal costs of coordinating a larger number of more specialized workers (Becker and 
Murphy, 1992). As Camancho (1991) has shown, the larger an organization is, the higher the 
number of people that would remain inactive during some part of the production period, and 
the greater the costs for coordinating efficient workflows. 
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Coordination costs are reduced if the organization has a highly uniform identity or has 
a high goal consistency, as there is a lesser need to monitor behaviour that might deviate from 
central organizational objectives (Williamson, 1967). The driving influence of owner-
manager values in small firms (Hammann et al, 2009) and the frequency of personal 
interactions between senior- and middle management as well as workers can facilitate 
coordination and mutual understanding (Courrent and Gundolf, 2009). Thus coordination 
costs are less pronounced for small firms than for large ones which have greater degrees of 
individual specialization and highly inconsistent goals across the organization.  
Our argument that coordination costs increase with firm size is consistent with the 
resource based view of the firm. Addressing the question of how many organizational 
capabilities are necessary to improve environmental performance (i.e., CSR walk), Russo and 
Fouts (1997, p. 538) argue that this ‘requires a fundamental shift in a firm’s culture and 
human resources and the organizational capabilities required to manage them. Management, 
R&D, production, and marketing all must be involved and committed if a firm is to 
implement a[n environmental] policy’. Firms need to cope with increased complexity for 
instance in production or delivery processes and require enhanced employee involvement, 
cross-disciplinary coordination and ‘increased skills from workers at all levels of the firm’. 
Shaver and Mezias (2009) add to this by arguing that the resources needed for effectively 
managing and coordinating complex operations increase disproportionately with firm size.  
Organizational inertia further complicates changes in administrative structures, and it 
has been shown that as firm size grows firms have a lower propensity to change (Dobrev et 
al., 2003). This is because large numbers of employees and business units as well as many 
layers of hierarchy make it more difficult for large firms to coordinate the reorganization of 
functional processes. In the context of coordinating CSR walk, this reflects the structural 
distance between those engaged in developing a centralized CSR strategy, and executive 
decision makers in decentralized divisions or functional units where the strategy needs to 
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come into effect (see Dougherty and Hardy, 1996). Research suggests that CSR managers in 
large firms who are responsible for thoroughly implementing a ‘CSR mindset’ and 
corresponding practices in decentralized business units report considerable difficulties and 
resistance among employees to accept new ways of working that depart from their 
accustomed routines (Haack et al., 2012; Wickert and de Bakker, 2015). We conclude that 
internal coordination becomes increasingly complex and costly to administer the larger the 
organization. 
In small firms, the typically informal coordination style, fewer hierarchical levels and 
low levels of bureaucracy most likely keep the internal coordination costs for implementing 
CSR in organizational processes relatively lower than in larger firms. Blau (1970) argued that 
social contacts and interaction with other functional specializations are more common in 
smaller organizations, where such departments might not formally exist. Social or 
environmental concerns that emerge from productive activities may therefore be more directly 
conveyed from owner-managers to employees, and vice versa, making it ‘easier for the 
concerns of ordinary workers to be heard’ (Darnall et al., 2010, p. 1077). 
In contrast, in large firms, managers close to the headquarters of an organization, such 
as CSR managers that are usually responsible for developing a CSR agenda and 
corresponding policies, must reach out and literally ‘persuade’ a myriad of employees in 
functional positions that may have highly divergent interests in relation to the organization’s 
overall objectives (Wickert and de Bakker, 2015). Thus, internally coordinating the 
components of a CSR programme, including awareness raising among employees, in 
particular information about the nature of the adequate organizational practices, structures, 
and procedures from the top to the bottom of an organization becomes increasingly resource 
intensive – and hence costly – the larger the organization. Pinkse et al. (2010) provide a good 
example that the coordination and implementation of an environmental strategy, which they 
empirically examine in a large firm, is extremely costly. They show that high levels of 
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absorptive capacity are necessary to overcome internal complexity, geographic diversity and 
cultural heterogeneity. While such capacity in general is said to facilitate the diffusion of 
environmental management practices, they (2010, p. 169) found ‘that due to high context 
specificity of environment-related knowledge, in many areas building sufficient shared 
absorptive capacity (...) seems overly costly, if not impossible’.  
In sum, this suggests that the costs for coordinating CSR walk increase as firm size 
increases. As we will show below, the relatively higher control and coordination costs for 
walking CSR in large firms are in stark contrast to the relatively lower costs for talking CSR 
in large firms, and vice versa in small firms. 
CSR Talk, Organizational Costs and Firm Size 
While the costs for walking CSR tend to increase the larger a firm becomes, the costs for 
talking CSR tend to decrease. For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) have argued that 
economies of scope accrue in the joint provision of CSR attributes over many different 
products. In other words, large and highly diversified firms can generate cost savings if the 
impression they aim to create with CSR talk is attributed to a high number of products or 
services. Because ‘the goodwill generated from firm-level CSR-related advertising can be 
leveraged across a variety of the firm’s brands’ (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p. 123), larger 
firms have lower average costs of external CSR communication and they usually have more 
resources than small firms to offer differing product lines and sophisticated product 
differentiation strategies through marketing or modifications. In contrast, in terms of walking 
CSR, given that large firms are usually more diversified than small firms (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001), CSR practices such as environmentally friendly product ingredients would 
have to be adapted to specific requirements that are more complex the larger product 
portfolios become. This implies additional implementation costs and reduces the possibility to 
generate economies of scope. 
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Evidence of the relatively strong development of external communication and 
symbolic impression management activities in relation to CSR in large firms supports our 
argument (Bowen, 2014; Delmas and Burbano, 2011). Given the higher visibility of most 
large firms and the increasing pressure of external stakeholders to make those firms’ CSR 
engagement more transparent (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011), greater sophistication of CSR 
reporting has become a priority for many large firms (Castelló and Lozano, 2011; Du et al., 
2010). Indeed, empirical results show that voluntary CSR reporting decreases the cost of 
equity capital for publicly traded firms that are under greater media and investor scrutiny 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Large firms, however, can relatively easily construct a CSR-façade by 
establishing a CSR department that handles PR-requests and is responsible for formally 
reporting CSR activities with high production values. Because it is often ‘difficult for 
consumers and other stakeholders to asses a firm’s [true] social performance’ (Siegel and 
Vitaliano, 2007, p. 775), large firms can take advantage of the information asymmetry 
between internal processes and externally projected images. This is exacerbated because 
stakeholders of large and highly visible firms (consider Nike, McDonalds, or Apple) often 
have a relatively low proximity to the firm (i.e., low spatial nearness), which makes it more 
difficult for them to distinguish between CSR walk and talk (Courrent and Gundolf, 2009). 
Assuming that the establishment of a CSR department involves some initial cost and human 
resources but then remains relatively constant, economies of scale can be realized because its 
proportionate size and relative cost declines the larger a firm becomes.  
At the same time, research suggests that, surprisingly, markets grant higher financial 
rewards to firms that report about their CSR processes, such as commitments and public 
statements to improve environmental performance, rather than their CSR outcomes, such as 
effective reduction of emissions or toxic releases (Delmas et al., 2013). This creates a further 
incentive for CSR talk among large firms stemming from asymmetric information. For firms 
reporting on CSR it is financially beneficial to focus on relatively cheaper processes that are 
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intangible and difficult to measure, rather than costly improvements of CSR outcomes. For 
instance, many large firms promote their participation in the United Nations Global Compact 
or the Dow Jones Sustainability Index – initiatives that have repeatedly been accused of being 
little more than public relations exercises (Berliner and Prakash, 2015). From a strategic point 
of view, there is a double-stimulus for large firms to focus on less costly CSR talk that is 
higher financially rewarded than CSR walk.  
For smaller firms, in contrast, externally communicating their CSR engagement to the 
public by following formal guidelines or standards is relatively costly. As a consequence only 
few small firms report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standard 
despite the recent efforts of GRI to attract more of these firms (Brown et al., 2009). 
Notwithstanding this, given the small number of employees and flat hierarchies in small 
firms, information can more easily be shared and discussed in informal settings across the 
organization. Because of close moral proximity, the influence of the leader(s) is still more 
pervasive than in large firms, meaning that employees can directly interact with CSR role 
models, such as owner-managers (Courrent and Gundolf, 2009). Often, small firm owner-
managers choose to implement responsible business practices out of conviction and at their 
own discretion rather than for instrumental reasons (Jenkins, 2004; Wickert, 2014). In 
particular smaller owner-managed firms tend not to emphasize material wealth – in contrast to 
profit-maximizing large firms that are under greater shareholder pressure to maximise the 
return on investment (Spence and Rutherfoord, 2001). In general, owner-managed firms that 
are usually smaller in size tend to face lower pressure from investors to maximize their 
returns, giving them more legitimacy to devote resources to socially responsible business 
practices (Quinn, 1997).  
While we do not suggest that non-economic motives are absent for large firms, the 
institutional requirements around large corporations necessarily, often legally, encompass the 
prioritising of economic drivers to, for example, maximise the return on investment to 
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shareholders. As even Milton Friedman acknowledges, smaller firms in contrast go somewhat 
under the radar in this respect, lacking public fora in which the financial veracity of its leaders 
are held to account, and are freer to make decisions based on non-economic reasoning 
(Friedman, 1970; Gray et al., 1995).  
There is a lack of consensus here about suitable terminology, but the broadly speaking 
intrinsic drive for socially responsible activities among smaller businesses has been 
consistently identified and labelled ‘silent CSR’ (Jenkins, 2004), or ‘implicit CSR’ (Matten 
and Moon, 2008). This is in line with Oliver’s (1997) characterisation of normative rather 
than economic rationality guiding resource decisions. Given such an intrinsic motivation to 
engage in CSR a mismatch between CSR activity and stated intent seems much less likely in 
particular among owner-managed small firms than for public large firms. 
In terms of talking CSR, unlike larger firms, smaller firms tend to employ informal, 
personalized mechanisms to interact with their stakeholders (Fassin, 2008). As such, 
communication with a selected group of high-proximity stakeholders is done on the basis of 
face-to-face interaction rather than formal written accounts such as annual CSR reports 
(Lähdesmäki, 2012). Lacking the power and economic rationality to manage stakeholders and 
resources optimally for maximising economic rents (Oliver, 1997) smaller firms are less 
likely to be able to draw on institutional or resource-based capital. More appropriate for the 
smaller firm is that which has been called a ‘socializing’ process of accountability (Roberts, 
2001). Therein, CSR activities are accounted for by day-to-day relations, lateral exchange and 
dialogue with suppliers, employees or customers, and are characterized by a high moral 
intensity (Courrent and Gundolf, 2009). This offers small firms the opportunity for a full 
reciprocal discussion and development of personal recognition and identity (Lähdesmäki, 
2012).  
Meeting the increasingly demanding formal reporting requirements for CSR, such as 
structuring a report along the extensive performance indicators of the GRI, appears to be 
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uninviting for smaller firms (Brown et al., 2009; Global Reporting Initiative, 2011). 
Commonly expected quality standards for CSR reports have expanded, and for smaller firms 
a relatively high and even prohibitive share of resources is required to draft a ‘high-gloss’ 
report, a website, or to pay membership fees or make donations to CSR initiatives (see Fassin, 
2008). In addition, due to their low visibility and the absence of media attention, and thus 
limited readership, it is unlikely that small firms would see a significant benefit in a publicity-
driven approach to CSR, in contrast to most large firms (Gray et al., 1995). Thus, the financial 
incentives to direct resources to costly but largely unnoticed reporting are comparably limited.  
Given the earlier discussion on intrinsic motivation of owner-managed smaller firms 
to implement CSR, a desire for replacing substantive CSR implementation with what may be 
perceived as a de-personalized branding exercise is less likely (Nielsen and Thomsen, 2009). 
Importantly, engaging with external stakeholders by working in (formal or informal) 
partnerships and including them in decision-making processes about the adequate 
implementation of CSR issues is a relatively common practice for smaller firms (Wickert, 
2014). In general, smaller firms tend not to have the resources to continuously generate 
knowledge about the increasingly complex issue of CSR and therefore need input and 
guidance from external stakeholders to manage such processes (Spence et al., 2003). The CSR 
implementation process of small firms is typically a cooperative one in which they draw on 
their social capital with stakeholders to which they have high proximity (Russo and Perrini, 
2010; Spence et al., 2003). For instance, small firms usually keep their number of suppliers 
limited to a few key parties and select them based on long-term relationships characterized by 
honesty and mutual trust, avoiding expensive switching and screening costs (Wickert, 2014).  
In contrast, the development of stable stakeholder relations where joint norms, values 
and strategies need to be discursively exchanged is challenging and costly for large firms. 
Large firms with global supply chains and production networks are simultaneously facing 
legitimate and diverging stakeholder interests at a global level (Scherer et al., 2013), both 
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internally, for instance their employees in subsidiaries, and externally, such as the 
communities in which they operate. This represents a major obstacle for the systematic 
integration of external stakeholder concerns in the implementation process of CSR. In order 
to change the ‘naming and shaming’ game and constructively cooperate with critical 
stakeholders, trust needs to be restored by cost-intensive stakeholder dialogues or other 
exchange platforms. However, large firms might be inclined to avoid the high costs of 
substantive stakeholder engagement and instead favour cheaper forms of CSR talk where 
information about CSR activities is merely transmitted to stakeholders without meaningful 
dialogue (Banerjee, 2008).  
We conclude that the organizational costs for talking CSR tend to decrease with firm 
size and thus provide financial incentives for large firms to focus on this aspect of CSR 
engagement, while avoiding relatively costly CSR walk. Smaller firms in turn have lower 
benefits as well as higher costs (relative to their total costs) when talking CSR. We 
consolidate these arguments into a conceptual model that explains the aforementioned 
differences between talking and walking CSR in small and large firms. 
A Conceptual Model of CSR Engagement 
Our foregoing argumentation suggests that firm size and corresponding organizational 
structures have CSR-specific cost implications for talking versus walking. All else being 
equal, these imply favourable financial conditions that explain why small firms tend to focus 
on internal implementation of CSR but have little incentive for external public 
communication while the opposite case applies for large firms. We term these patterns the 
small firm CSR communication gap, and the large firm CSR implementation gap. As we have 
shown, larger firms have a CSR implementation gap, because the implementation of CSR 
practices and procedures into core business operations is relatively costly compared to 
relatively less costly external public communication and symbolic impression management of 
CSR. This is based on the insight that the costs for controlling and coordinating centralized 
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activities, such as talking CSR, are relatively lower than the costs for controlling and 
coordinating decentralized activities, such as walking CSR. In contrast, smaller firms have a 
CSR communication gap, because for them the public communication of CSR is relatively 
costly in comparison to relatively less costly implementation of CSR practices and procedures 
into core business operations. Therefore, in small firms the costs for talking CSR are 
relatively higher than the costs for walking CSR. 
Figure 1 schematically illustrates our key arguments. The horizontal axis depicts the 
continuum of increasing firm size. The vertical axis depicts the relative organizational costs of 
CSR engagement defined as the relative share of the costs of talking and walking CSR in total 
firm costs. The costs for talking CSR predominantly imply fixed costs, whose relative share 
in total costs declines with growing firm size (see McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). This 
includes fixed expenses such as human and financial resources for establishing a CSR 
department, for publishing a report, crafting policy documents, or formally joining CSR 
initiatives. These activities increase the overall cost, but due to their fixed cost elements 
remain relatively constant. Therefore, it is easy to realize economics of scale.  
In contrast, walking CSR predominantly implies variable costs, as practices and 
procedures have to be individually adjusted throughout the value chain. Consequently, while 
the share of fixed costs for CSR talk would decrease the larger the firm becomes, variable 
costs for CSR walk that are tied to the number and scope of business processes which need to 
be changed tend to increase the larger the firm becomes. For instance, a large firm needs to 
spend more resources to monitor diversified and geographically distant divisions, or it might 
have to pay higher material costs per unit if sourcing from suppliers that have an 
environmental or social certification (see McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Economies of scale 
are more difficult to realize for those activities that are predominantly decentralized and 
which imply variable costs. 
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Variable costs also apply for CSR walk in smaller firms. However, the relatively lower 
costs for control and coordination make the organizational implementation of CSR more 
favourable in financial terms for small firms compared to less favourable external CSR 
communication. In figure 1, the space between the two cost curves (black/dotted) indicates 
the cost-differentials for the small firm CSR communication gap and the large firm CSR 
implementation gap. Notably, in seeking to visualize our theoretical arguments in a simplified 
manner, our model does not suggest a specific scope of the respective gaps. However, as the 
graph shows, we argue that the small firm gap is most likely lesser than the large firm gap. 
This is because the ‘delta’, i.e. difference between the relative small firm costs for walking 
versus talking CSR, is comparably lower than the delta for large firms, for which CSR walk is 
significantly more costly than CSR talk. Our key arguments composing the theoretical model 
can be summarized in two propositions: 
Proposition 1: In large firms the CSR implementation gap increases with 
increasing firm size. 
Proposition 2: In small firms the CSR communication gap increases with 
decreasing firm size. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Opportunities for empirical research arise in exploring how the scope of these 
conceptual gaps could be measured, and to investigate under which conditions the small firm 
communication gap is likely smaller than the large firm implementation gap; or if very small 
or micro and very large organizations have a respectively larger gap. Scholars could also 
examine the probable non-linear development of the two cost curves we have sketched or 
explore the existence of and conditions for an optimal firm size with regards to CSR 
engagement so that both gaps can be narrowed. Most importantly, future research should 
examine and add potentially relevant contextual variables to our model, such as the cost-
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implications of CSR talk and walk in different industry or regulatory contexts. In the 
following, we first discuss several theoretical implications of the conceptual model that 
extend our understanding of size-related differences in CSR engagement and then propose a 
size-aware research agenda of CSR engagement. 
Theoretical Implications 
Our model seeks to add clarity to the field of CSR by showing how economic pressures may 
help to explain differences between walking and talking CSR among small and large firms. 
We provide an analytical tool that expands earlier work which aimed to explain differences in 
CSR engagement (Campbell, 2007; Darnall et al., 2010; Husted and Salazar, 2006; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), but has underemphasized disparities between symbolic and 
substantial forms of CSR, and thus was limited in explaining the large firm tendency of not 
‘walking the talk’, and the small firm tendency of not ‘talking the walk’.  
We also add to recent work that examined greenwashing in the CSR context, but 
where the focus was largely on exogenous determinants, such as opacity of product 
characteristics, while limiting attention to firm size to not more than a control variable (see 
Bowen, 2014, for a critical review). This literature served as a valuable starting point for our 
observation that greenwashing ‘pervades our contemporary capitalist society’ (Bowen, 2014, 
p. 8). We expand this work with a detailed analysis of the internal organizational mechanisms 
that explain why greenwashing is more likely the larger a firm becomes. 
In addressing these limitations of extant research, we have proposed that 
organizational costs of CSR engagement – including the total money, time and other 
resources associated with CSR engagement – create favourable financial terms that can 
explain the differences in the CSR engagement patterns between smaller and larger firms. 
Size-related organizational costs imply that large firms have structural characteristics that 
make centralized activities such as symbolically talking CSR relatively less costly than in 
small firms. This is to a great extent due to their ability to realize economies of scale and 
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scope. In contrast, small firms have structural characteristics that make decentralized 
activities such as substantively walking CSR relatively less costly, and vice versa. This is to a 
great extent due to their ability to benefit from low bureaucracy, less internal complexity, and 
strong identity, often based on the values of the owner-manager. From an economic and 
strategically motivated point of view, this allows us to better understand accusations brought 
forward against large firms for overstretching symbolic aspects of CSR, and the relative 
neglect of small firms in the CSR debate, as they tend to remain silent about their CSR 
activities. These insights contribute to the theory of the firm perspective on CSR 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) and – as we will show below – can be complemented with 
insights from institutional theory. 
A closer examination of the cost implications of CSR engagement seems especially 
pertinent considering that a link between increased CSR engagement and financial 
performance or enhanced competitiveness remains contested (Delmas et al., 2013; Tang et al., 
2012). At the same time, however, large firms face increasing pressure by consumers, 
investors and civil society activists to appear socially responsible (Campbell, 2007). These 
stakeholder demands and company responses have promoted the progressing 
institutionalization of CSR (Bondy et al., 2012) as a ‘must-have’, rather than a voluntary 
strategic choice. As a result, most large firms feel pressured to engage in CSR independent of 
tangible financial benefits. Since CSR activities in particular of large firms become 
increasingly standardized (Haack et al., 2012; Marano and Kostova, 2015), this may lead to a 
further erosion of competitive advantages generated from CSR engagement, for instance as a 
means of differentiation from competitors. Installing expensive CSR measures without clear 
paybacks thus incurs costs rather than benefits. Departing from benefits-based views to 
explain CSR hence gains importance the more CSR becomes institutionalised.  
This view is exacerbated, because it has been widely argued that external appearance 
rather than the fact of conformity between appearance and internal practices is often 
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presumed to be sufficient for the attainment of a socially responsible image (Oliver, 1991), 
and, as our model suggests, less costly (Berliner and Prakash, 2015; Delmas et al., 2013). This 
makes it even more financially attractive for large firms to engage in inexpensive CSR talk, 
rather than expensive CSR walk. Economically speaking, CSR thus remains of strategic 
importance for firms, but not from the perspective of enhancing competitiveness, 
differentiation or financial gains (which would lead to more tangible benefits), but in order to 
conform to societal demands (which incurs tangible costs) and simultaneously reducing costs. 
Our theoretical model also connects to institutional theory and studies that examine 
decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The large firm implementation gap reflects a form of 
decoupling, where symbolic communication about the implementation of CSR-related 
organizational practices does not correspond with the actual implementation of these 
practices. In this sense, our model introduces a novel economic perspective on potential firm-
level antecedents of decoupling, where different patterns of decoupling in smaller and larger 
firms have been underemphasized in the literature. While extant research tends to emphasize 
external determinants for decoupling (e.g., Haack et al., 2012; Marquis and Qian, 2014), a 
consideration of organizational costs can provide a more accurate picture of the potentially 
significant influence of firm-specific, and in particular cost-related factors. This allows us to 
better explain why decoupling might be more likely in large firms, while small firms have 
less incentives to decouple. As yet, the literature has underemphasised the influence of firm 
size on decoupling, and our model presents a starting point for further inquiry. 
Our perspective on the relative organizational cost of talking versus walking CSR also 
marks a new theoretical perspective for CSR research in relation to small firms. Previously, 
differences in CSR engagement of small firms predominantly referred to the lack of a profit-
maximizing motive where owner-managers have the autonomy and stewardship not to 
maximize shareholder value (Jenkins, 2004), but discretion to direct resources to socially or 
environmentally responsible business practices (Quinn, 1997). It has been argued that small 
JMS S0299 – final version 30 
firm owner-managers are not driven by profit maximization, but instead by profit-satisficing 
behaviour, along with a range of personal, social and cultural motivations (Spence and 
Rutherfoord, 2001). Hence, researchers and policy-makers seeking to promote CSR by 
exclusively focussing on potential payoffs are ill-judged. From a managerial point of view, 
rather than linking CSR to financial returns – that as we have shown are often intangible, 
rather difficult to calculate ex ante and difficult to attribute to CSR ex post – a focus on 
effectively managing organizational costs would have greater resonance for encouraging CSR 
engagement in small firms.  
In general, we do not assume that our approach is exhaustive in explaining different 
patterns of CSR engagement. Rather, it presents an important and as yet underemphasized 
complement to the extant picture in the CSR literature where much attention has been paid to 
determinants that are either based on individual characteristics, such as managerial ethics 
(e.g., Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004), firm-level characteristics such as ownership (Jenkins, 
2004), or largely external to the firm, such as heterogeneous stakeholders demands (Scherer et 
al., 2013). We acknowledge that an important alternative explanation for the implementation 
and communication gaps that we theorized can be based on institutional and stakeholder 
theory. We briefly sketch this explanation below, and show that it is nevertheless consistent 
with our cost-based theorizing, and thus offers fruitful avenues for future research combining 
economic and institutional perspectives empirically and conceptually. 
Institutional theory suggests that firms evaluate legitimacy-expectations of 
stakeholders and adjust their CSR behaviour (e.g., Campbell, 2007; Chiu and Sharfman, 
2011). This perspective is complementary to our model, because smaller and larger firms 
would evaluate stakeholder expectations and then decide to invest in CSR talk or walk when 
aiming to secure their legitimacy. As we have argued, larger firms usually have more 
visibility and are under tighter stakeholder scrutiny with regard to their CSR engagement 
(Chiu and Sharfman, 2011). From a legitimacy perspective, they are more inclined to invest in 
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CSR talk in the form of impression management and creating a symbolic image of social 
responsibility to satisfy stakeholder expectations (Perez-Batres et al., 2012). At the same time, 
thoroughly evaluating complex internal processes that would reflect serious CSR walk is 
difficult for stakeholders such as NGOs (Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007). This reduces the 
incentive for large firms to invest equally in CSR implementation, given that financial returns 
are ambiguous and the threat of boycotts can often be mitigated by even more sophisticated 
impression management strategies. McDonnell and King (2013, p. 387) for instance show that 
firms confronted with consumer boycotts react by defending ‘their public image by using 
prosocial claims’, where such ‘prosocial claims operate as an impression management tactic 
meant to protect targeted firms by diluting the negative media attention attracted by the 
boycott’. This large firm CSR engagement pattern preferring CSR talk based on legitimacy 
expectations corresponds with our model and the predictions we made based on internal 
economic determinants.  
Legitimacy as a determinant for CSR engagement in smaller firms would equally 
imply that these firms favour CSR walk over CSR talk. This is because, as we argued earlier, 
smaller firms tend to be much more locally embedded and in proximity to their immediate 
stakeholders. Business partners, suppliers and customers that provide small firms with 
legitimacy usually do so by creating social capital (Russo and Perrini, 2010; Spence et al., 
2003). Close proximity to stakeholders thus makes it more likely that small firms refrain from 
creating symbolic CSR images that might be more easily uncovered and dismissed by their 
external observers, but instead invest in CSR walk in order to enhance their social capital. 
That smaller firms have a higher propensity to care for social balance also reflects arguments 
raised by proponents of stewardship theory, where it is contended that actors see themselves 
as stewards who engage in cooperative behaviour to advance collectivist rather than 
individual interests (Davis et al., 1997). Commensurate with this, Jamali et al. (2009) note 
that in contrast to MNCs, socially responsible small businesses tend to operate on a basis 
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informed by moral reflection and stewardship, and be preoccupied with the internal 
dimension of responsibility and issues relating to employee well-being. 
In summary, taking internal firm determinants based on organizational costs into more 
explicit account opens up several opportunities for future size-aware and comparative size 
research in CSR that could be linked to existing studies focussing on legitimacy and 
corresponding responses to external pressures. Below, we expand these arguments and 
develop a research agenda that could further nuance the observed disparities between CSR 
talk and walk in small and large firms. 
A Size-Aware Research Agenda for CSR Engagement 
Our model provides a foundation for multiple areas of future research. Most importantly we 
provide a theoretical basis for CSR research that goes beyond examining firm size as just 
another control variable. As we have shown, the comparison of small firms with large ones 
can yield important theoretical and practical insights. We suggest two particularly promising 
lines of inquiry for further theorizing. First, adding contextual variables to our model, and 
second, examining CSR talk and walk from a dynamic perspective.  
 First, context-sensitive research could examine how regulation density moderates the 
cost relationships. As social and environmental impacts differ between industries, it might be 
that in heavily regulated industries, such as mining or oil exploration, firms would seem more 
inclined to engage in CSR walk in order to avoid the costs of regulatory penalties. Whether 
the cost differential between walk and talk is actually lower remains nevertheless contested. 
In particular when looking at the intensely regulated extractive industries, there is substantial 
evidence that the most severe greenwashing allegations are brought forward exactly against 
large companies such as Shell, BP, Rio Tinto or Anglo-American (e.g. Lyon and 
Montgomery, 2015), which are accused of positioning ‘themselves as sustainable and drown 
the readers of their CSR reports in technical data but do no more than comply with basic 
environmental laws’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, p. 1114). Despite regulation, evidence 
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suggests that large firms still try to get away with the relatively cheaper CSR talk. This might 
be due to the inadequacy of many CSR rankings to distinguish between walk and talk, and the 
lack of emphasis on performance outcomes, rather than the mere adoption of favoured 
policies (Delmas et al., 2013). Future research should examine cost implications of CSR 
regulation in different industries, which vary in their environmental and social impacts, such 
as manufacturing and textile versus financial services. 
 This is important because contextual factors such as industry characteristics may cause 
costs to increase (or decrease), for communication as well as implementation. For large firms, 
the relative gap between costs for CSR walk and talk may shift as stakeholder scrutiny 
becomes more intense. NGOs for instance that often focus their campaigns on heavily 
polluting industries may become better equipped to detect greenwashing, or may require more 
sophisticated forms of substantive action. Smaller firms might face higher communication 
requirements when supplying large firms that expect formal reporting standards about the 
small firm’s CSR activities, or when their increased visibility would create higher stakeholder 
attention. However, learning effects may also reduce costs both in small and large firms. 
Next to industry characteristics, future research should also take a closer look at 
ownership characteristics. In our model we have taken the most common forms of ownership 
structures as a baseline assumption, namely that the majority of small firms are privately 
owned, while larger firms tend to be publicly owned. However, in the current paper we have 
not taken account of the potential influence in both small and large firms of family ownership 
which offers a further avenue for size-aware research. Nor have we sought to identify any 
differences between solely-owned, partnerships or multiply owned organizations – the latter 
might begin to exhibit some of the characteristics we associate with publicly owned larger 
firms, such as needing to provide reports to investors.  
Future research should also add nuance to our general model by distinguishing 
different types of CSR, for which cost implications may vary (Hoogendoorn et al., 2015). To 
JMS S0299 – final version 34 
construct a prudent theoretical model we have assumed that cost implications for CSR 
engagement are similar. However, CSR reflects a ‘basket’ of activities in relation to social, 
environmental and ethical responsibilities of firms. This might imply some variation in costs 
and benefits, for instance when comparing environmentally friendly production processes and 
socially responsible measures such as health and safety standards. It can thus be reasonably 
assumed that some CSR activities are more sensitive (e.g., environmental management, 
supply chain responsibility) to operational costs than others (e.g., corporate volunteering, 
philanthropy). However, the way we define CSR engagement in this paper explicitly caters to 
those activities that require firms to adjust operational practices and procedures, and thus have 
relatively high cost implications. We consider this to reflect the contemporary understanding 
of the roles and responsibilities of business firms in society, where attention has moved away 
from ‘how the money is spent’ (philanthropy without costly adjustments in core business 
operations) to ‘how the money is made’ (integration of CSR principles in strategy and core 
operations) (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007).  
Future research could pick up these points and examine the cost implications of 
different types of CSR that focus on environmental, social, employee- or community-related 
activities and which might for instance primarily address low- or high-proximity stakeholders 
as key beneficiaries. Here, scholars might further nuance the local- vs. global embeddedness 
of firms. Whereas small firms tend to be more locally embedded and thus have higher 
visibility to local stakeholders, large firms usually have a global reach and may be more 
inclined to ignore certain local situations in order to conform to industry behaviour at a 
broader level. Such embeddedness may have cost implications on CSR talk and walk. For 
instance, demands of local stakeholders are more likely to be homogeneous and focused, 
whereas globally distributed stakeholder groups probably have very heterogeneous 
expectations making their full implementation (‘walk’) very costly. 
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Second, while we have based our model on a static perspective of organizational costs 
and firm size, important opportunities for future research arise when investigating 
implications of a dynamic perspective, asking what happens if a firm grows? Longitudinal 
studies, for instance taking a qualitative case-based approach, could ask whether a small firm, 
characterized by a communication gap, would lessen this gap over time, with or without 
transforming it into an implementation gap as the firm grows. In other words, would existing 
CSR walk remain unchanged or would increasing organizational costs lead to an 
abandonment of extant practices, in favour of more symbolic and relatively cheaper CSR 
talk? Here, research could also distinguish between different forms of growth, which could be 
organic, or through mergers and acquisitions (Wickert et al., 2015), and for instance use 
quantitative approaches based on panel-data.  
We also deem it relevant to study whether an implementation or communication gap 
can remain stable over time. A large firm that maintains a considerable implementation gap 
over a longer period might be more vulnerable to public criticism and be accused of an 
unsubstantiated façade of CSR that undermines credibility with internal and external 
stakeholders of the organization. Employees might feel deceived by their employer when 
working for an apparently socially responsible firm that in reality is not. In such cases, 
decoupled CSR talk may provoke corrective action that could lead to full implementation of 
corresponding practices simply because most employees would refuse to see themselves as 
only ‘ceremonial props’ (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008, p. 88). In addition, external 
stakeholders such as NGOs might be even more inclined to start campaigning against a firm 
they judge as particularly hypocritical. Thus, the higher the publicly perceived 
implementation gap, the more likely it might be for that organization to become the target of 
boycotts or campaigns that harm its reputation, and the higher the cost of not implementing 
CSR.  
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Research based on CSR-related organizational costs should therefore take into account 
the opportunity cost of not engaging in either talking or walking CSR. For large firms with an 
extensive implementation gap, this might result in high ex-post costs, for instance to repair 
reputation caused by consumer boycotts or negative NGO-led campaigns. The respective cost 
implications, however, remain quite unclear. For smaller firms, there might be opportunity 
costs for not engaging in communication, if for instance large international buyers that 
increasingly require some sort of CSR standards from their suppliers might not award 
contracts or even de-list small firms that resist formally communicating their CSR activities. 
Research building on our model could further examine how firms evaluate cost implications 
differently based on whether they can be calculated ex ante, or whether cost implications only 
become tangible ex post. For instance, large firms might prefer CSR talk, because associated 
costs like the production of a CSR report can be relatively easily determined ex ante, while 
they might avoid CSR walk because this more likely implies considerable costs that can only 
be calculated ex post, such as regular supply chain audits and resulting adjustments of 
production processes. 
Another important avenue for further research on the dynamic perspective connects to 
the view on CSR communication that emphasizes the performative role of language on the 
emergence of different forms of organizing (e.g., Christensen et al., 2013; Crane & Glozer, 
2016; Haack et al., 2012; Wickert and Schaefer, 2015). Herein, CSR communication – talk – 
is not regarded as a counterpoint to CSR implementation – walk – but constitutive of it. 
Schoeneborn and Trittin (2013, p. 193) for instance suggest that ‘communication practices 
that concern CSR should not be generally dismissed as mere “greenwashing”’. Rather, 
‘aspirational talk’ (Christensen et al., 2013) can lead managers to ‘talk into existence’ new 
CSR practices by means of the language they use (Haack et al., 2012).  
We suggest that the constitutive perspective on CSR communication can benefit from 
our model. An important empirical question is to determine to what extent presumably higher 
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costs of implementation might prohibit CSR talk to materialize into new CSR practices, in 
other words more sophisticated implementation that meets its promise. Investigating potential 
barriers to practices being constituted through communication is important, as empirical 
evidence for this rather idealistic picture of communication remains scarce (Christensen et al., 
2013; Crane & Glozer, 2016; Morsing and Schultz, 2006). Even communication scholars 
admit that the one-way transmission-focused view of communication, which is implicit in our 
paper, represents a ‘fairly accurate picture of corporate communication processes today’ 
(Morsing and Schultz, 2006, p. 325). Likewise, Cornelissen (2014) argues that one-way 
communication in CSR is pervasive because, aside from cost-considerations, managers tend 
to be reluctant to give up some of their discretionary power and influence on strategically 
relevant decision-making processes. 
While we have developed our model based on the specifics of CSR, it can be applied 
to other contexts where firms are confronted with expectations to both walk and talk about 
their activities, for instance when adopting management concepts such as TQM or different 
ISO norms, or broader organizational change initiatives. Scholars could take our model as a 
starting point to look at cost implications of other highly visible strategic change initiatives 
where there might be a mismatch between presumably cheap investor-relations activities 
(‘talk’) and actual strategy implementation (‘walk’), such as in the case of stock repurchase 
programmes (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). However, what makes the CSR context distinctive 
is that it seems to be much more contested than other more technical practices, because it 
deals with the overall role of the firm in society. Highly divergent stakeholder expectations 
and internal firm requirements put the disparity between CSR talk and walk at the centre of 
attention.  
Boundary Conditions and Concluding Remarks 
We acknowledge some boundary conditions of our model, which are mainly due to our 
deliberate abstraction in order to construct a prudent theoretical argument. This includes our 
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assumption that the costs which can be attributed to CSR walk are primarily variable in 
nature, while the costs for CSR talk are primarily fixed. Furthermore, we did not assume that 
small firms are in general more willing to engage in CSR than large firms. However, under 
the condition that a small firm decides to engage in CSR, we have argued that it is more likely 
for this firm to show patterns of CSR walk rather than talk, while we would typically expect 
the opposite case for a large firm. This reflects our primary research interest in explaining the 
mismatch between walk and talk, rather than examining the willingness to engage in the first 
place. Based on extant research (see Josefy et al., 2015), we also assumed that large firms are 
generally more visible than smaller firms. There are, however, small firms in particular in the 
digital economy, whose visibility could be considered much higher than that of some large 
firms in traditional industries such as specialized automotive subcontractors. Future research 
should address this limitation and examine corresponding cost implications, but could take 
our theoretical arguments as a starting point.  
 Our assumptions about the cost-organizational size connections may not necessarily 
hold true in less developed national contexts where smaller firms face markedly lower market 
and non-market institutional pressures from a variety of stakeholders such as customers, 
NGOs, and the government. Our conceptual model thus reflects more accurately those 
conditions of competitive markets in developed countries
i
. Future research should study how 
such influences affect the cost curves that we have sketched. 
A further critique of our model is the existence of deviant cases. We acknowledge that 
there are large firms that issue comprehensive CSR reports and over time have substantially 
implemented CSR in their organizational processes and procedures – firms that are walking 
the talk (e.g., Bondy et al., 2012). Likewise, some small firms have not only implemented 
procedures, but also communicate their CSR activities effectively to external audiences 
(Nielsen and Thomsen, 2009). It should also be noted that small firms are not a homogenous 
group, and may not all fit the standard form we have presented here. Some small firms may 
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neither be familiar with the CSR concept nor have considered how to integrate CSR into core 
business routines despite their favourable organizational conditions. They may deny any sort 
of social responsibility particularly if operating in the informal economy prior to establishing 
a viable business, though there is so little research on informal small businesses and CSR that 
this remains an area for future study.  
Overall, our aim was to contribute to size-aware and comparative size research in CSR 
that scrutinizes the mismatch of CSR talk and walk. This is theoretically important because a 
focus on the tangible organizational costs for talking versus walking CSR revives a classic but 
as yet largely neglected economic dimension for further exploring variation in how firms 
engage in CSR. It is also relevant from a societal point of view, because a better 
understanding of the dynamics of CSR engagement might encourage more firms to walk the 
talk of social and environmental responsibility. 
                                                 
i
 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this limitation. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Relative organizational cost of CSR engagement (as relative share of the costs of 
CSR walk and CSR talk in total firm cost). Black line: Relative cost of CSR talk; dotted line: 
Relative cost of CSR walk. Source: Own illustration; developed from Baumann-Pauly et al., 
2013. 
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